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INFORMATION EVALUATION BEHAVIOR INA COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT: CONTEXTAND TASK EFFECTS
ABSTRACT
This paper reports the results of an experiment in which subjects
assuming the role of division managers in a decentralized firm made subjective
information system evaluations. It extends existing subjective information
evaluation research by: (1) incorporating a two-person competitive environment,
(2) investigating the effects of context and task variables on information evaluation
behavior, and (3) focusing on the actual choice of information system, rather than
on judgment aspects of the task. Subjects' information system choices indicated
misperception of information values, consistent with previous studies. This
occured even though no complex calculations of information demand value were
required in the experiment. Context did not have an aggregate effect on
information evaluation behavior. However, the manner in which costs associated
with information systems were presented had different effects on behavior across
contexts. The findings of the study indicate that: (1) individuals ignore the
strategic implications of private information, (2) overvaluation of information is a
fairly pervasive phenomenon, and (3) problem context and system cost allocations
may affect the evaluation and usage of information systems in organizational
settings.

INFORMATION EVALUATION BEHAVIOR INA COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT: CONTEXTAND TASK EFFECTS
One of the principal roles of accounting information is to help individuals
resolve uncertainty in a problem prior to making a decision. This usage is
commonly referred to as the "decision-facilitating" role of accounting information
[Demski and Feltham 1976, p. 9]. Accountants often face the task of evaluating
alternative systems for generating this type of information.
Accounting researchers have utilized the theory of information economics
to develop criteria for the evaluation of management accounting systems. This
theoretical framework assumes that individuals act consistently with the
expected utility hypothesis. Experimental research has shown, however, that
individuals' subjective evaluations of information systems are not always
consistent with the values calculated using information economics [Hilton,
Swieringa, and Hoskin, 1981; Hilton and Swieringa, 1981; Schepanski and
Uecker, 1983; Uecker, Schepanski, and Shin, 1985].
This paper examines the task of choosing an information system in a
multi-person scenario where individual objectives are in conflict. In doing so, it
also investigates the effects of problem context and stated cost of information on
individuals' information system choices. The paper reports an experiment in
which subjects assumed the role of one of two division managers in a
decentralized firm. The subjects interacted with a microcomputer, which played
the role of the other manager.
This paper has four features which distinguish it from previous research.
First, it addresses the problem of subjective information evaluation in a two-
person environment with conflicting individual objectives. Within such an
environment, a private information system may affect the actions of the person
without access to the system. As a result, the value of information may differ
from that in a single-person setting or in a multi-person setting where individual
objectives are not in conflict [Baiman, 1975]. Current analytical models utilized in
accounting research recognize this and generally assume a multi-person
environment with conflicting objectives [Baiman, 1982; Demski and Kreps, 1982].
However, very little experimental work has been conducted within such an
environment. In particular, it is not known whether individuals consider
strategic implications when deciding whether or not to choose a given
information system.
Second, this paper investigates the effect of context and task characteristics
on information evaluation behavior. Existing subjective information evaluation
research has only incorporated variables directly related to the economic demand
value of information. However, the contexts in which information system
evaluation problems are encountered often differ. Also, task effects, such as the
manner in which the costs associated with a system are allocated, may vary. The
findings of a number of recent studies of other decision problems involving
uncertainty [Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981; Payne, 1982] suggest that subjective
evaluations of information systems may be affected by context and task variables.
These variables may affect the decision strategies used to evaluate an information
system and, in turn, individuals' basic perceptions of the value of information.
These effects may occur instead of, or in addition to, the effects of the variables
that enter into the calculation of the demand value of information.
Third, the paper examines the problem of making a choice whether or not
to utilize a given information system, rather than a judgment of its value.
Existing studies have almost exclusively taken the latter approach, which tends to
focus on the issue of whether subjects are good intuitive statisticians. In contrast,
the choice approach focuses on individuals' basic perceptions of the value of
information and the decisions made based on those perceptions. While models
based on the expected utility hypothesis specify judgment as a prerequisite for
choice, behavioral research has shown that decision makers do not always follow
this process [Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981, pp. 73-74; Payne, 1982, p. 389].
Judgment may generally be an aid to choice, but it is neither necessary nor
sufficient for choice. Therefore, the approach taken here is to investigate whether
the decisions made by individuals are the same as those predicted by economic
theories of information evaluation, given certain combinations of context and task
variables.
Finally, the information systems evaluated by the subjects generated perfect
information on the state outcome, rather than imperfect information.
Computation of the demand value of an information system which generates
imperfect information is a complex problem. Observed choices that are not
consistent with economically optimal choices could occur because of the cognitive
limitations of the subjects, context or task factors, or any combination of these.
The use of perfect information avoids this potential confounding of effects. At the
same time, the competitive setting keeps the problem of evaluating a perfect
information system from becoming a trivial one.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, the relationship
of context and task variables to the information evaluation problem is discussed.
Second, the experimental method and hypotheses are described. The following
section presents the experimental results. The final section of the paper
discusses alternative explanations of the results and possible extensions of the
present study.
TheoreticalDevelopment
Schepanski and Uecker [1983] and Uecker, Schepanski, and Shin [1985]
found that individuals consistently ascribed positive value to information systems,
even when the optimal economic value of these systems was zero. This research
suggests that individuals may perceive the value of information as positive, even
when it is not. However, other evidence on whether overvaluation is a general
tendency is not clear. Hilton and Swieringa [1982] also found their subjects
consistently overvalued information. On the other hand, Hilton, Swieringa, and
Hoskin [1982] used a similar elicitation technique and reported that only a portion
of their subjects overvalued information.
Inconsistencies between subjective valuations of information systems
relative to their theoretical expected value may depend on context and/or task
variables. Context effects in decision making research are synonymous with
content, especially as it relates to the perceived values of the objects in a decision
set under consideration [Payne, 1982, p. 386]. The specific context effect
investigated here is differences in perceived information value arising from slight
wording changes in an information evaluation problem. Task effects are
associated with the structure of a decision problem. The task variable examined
in this study is the presentation mode for information system costs, that is,
whether the system costs are or are not allocated to the user.
Context Effects
Context effects arising from slight wording changes have been
demonstrated in a number of problems involving decision making under
uncertainty, such as gambles for money, medical decisions about saving lives,
and decisions whether or not to purchase insurance [Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980; Slovic,
Fischhoff, and Lichentenstein, 1982]. Since information evaluation is basically a
decision to employ a system that will reduce or eliminate uncertainty, it may be
subject to similar effects. There are two alternative premises tested in this study
with respect to context.
The first premise is that individuals will overvalue information when
presented with an explicit information purchase decision, but not when the
problem is presented in more general terms, e.g., as an opportunity to reduce
uncertainty. This prediction is based upon the context effects in insurance
purchase decisions observed by Hershey and Schoemaker [1980] and further
discussed by Slovic, et al. [1982]. In these studies, individuals responded
differently when a problem was framed as a choice between a sure loss and a
lottery with a loss component than when it was framed as a decision to pay an
insurance premium to protect against loss. Given the same set of values in both
problems, the majority of subjects chose the risky prospect in the gambling
problem, while the majority decided to pay the premium in the insurance
problem. One of the reasons Slovic, et al. [1982] gave for this result was that the
insurance context may trigger social norms about prudent behavior that are not
associated with the preference context. Individuals may operate with similar
beliefs about the value of information. When presented with an information
evaluation context, they may view information as a valuable good. However, they
will not do this in a generalized uncertainty reduction context, where information
is not explicitly labelled as such.
The alternative premise is that individuals will overvalue information,
regardless of context. This is supported by the notion that persons are
uncomfortable with uncertain outcomes, thus rinding the reduction or omission
of uncertainty a useful cognitive simplification mechanism [Hogarth, 1975, p.273].
Any mechanism that is thought to reduce uncertainty may be perceived as valua-
ble, even though it may have no effect on final outcomes [Langer, 1977].
Task Effects
The subjective information evaluation research discussed at the beginning
of this section focused upon elicitation of demand values. That is, experimenters
determined the stated cost at which subjects would be indifferent between a given
information system and no information. Within an organization, however, the
stated cost of an information system to a user may or may not equal its expected
value, or even the actual cost of implementing the system. For example, the costs
of producing certain reports may be borne entirely by a data processing
department within an organization. Alternatively, these costs may be allocated to
individual corporate units.
Stated cost may affect the behavior of information evaluators in one of two
ways. First, it may be used as an evaluation criterion within a simplified decision
process, in lieu of expected value. Individuals following such an approach set an
arbitrary stated cost cutoff point beyond which they will not utilize information,
regardless of its expected value. In these cases, undervaluation of information,
as well as overvaluation, may occur. A second possibility is that individuals may
employ simplified decision strategies when information is costless or has low
stated cost, and strategies consistent with economic theory beyond a given cost
threshold. This prediction is derived from a cost-benefit framework for decision
strategy selection [Beach and Mitchell, 1978] in that higher levels of stated cost are
assumed to increase task demand, i.e., the perceived need to use analytic decision
strategies.
The occurrence of either of these stated cost effects may depend on context.
Individuals may employ stated cost as a sole decision cue in an information
evaluation context and act according to economic theory in an uncertainty
reduction context, regardless of stated cost. Alternatively, they may view the cost
of information as a payment for obtaining a valuable good in the information
evaluation context and as a loss in the uncertainty reduction context. This would
result in consistent overvaluation of information in the first context and use of
stated cost as a decision cue in the latter. This effect is consistent with a shift in
reference point due to framing, where the reference point is the status quo in an
uncertainty reduction context, while it is one's position after purchasing the
information in the information evaluation context.
Method
Experimental Setting
The setting of the experiment is a firm which produces a single product.
The firm has two divisions, each headed by a single manager (Manager A and
Manager B). The firm's output and the payoffs to the managers depend jointly on
the actions of the managers and the outcome of a random state of nature. Each
manager has a choice of one of two actions and there are two possible states of
nature. Both managers are aware of each other's payoffs and preferences. In
one possible scenario, each manager might be responsible for one stage of the
production process for a precision tool, with one in charge of the casting
department and the other responsible for the machining department. The actions
of the managers represent the level of effort expended by each, while the random
parameter represents the quality of the raw materials used in the process.
Manager A has the opportunity to utilize an information system which
generates perfect information on the state outcome (t|p). Alternatively, he may
choose to act without an information system (i.e., "use" the null information
system Cn°). Manager B knows Manager As information system choice.
It can be shown that, depending on the payoff sets of both managers, that
Manager A's private information can have zero, positive, or negative expected
value (See Appendix A.). This is in contrast to a single-person or decision-
theoretic setting, where the Fineness Corollary of BlackwelTs Theorem states that
the value of a finer information system is always greater than or equal to that of a
coarser one. The result is counterintuitive, but the present example has a clear
practical interpretation. First, assume the two actions available to each manager
represent high and low levels of effort. When neither manager has private
information, the best strategy for both is to expend a high level of effort. When
Manager A has private information, he is able to adjust his effort level contingent
on the state outcome. At the same time, the payoffs are such that it is no longer
optimal for Manager B to expend a high effort level. This affects the firm's total
output and, in turn, lowers Manager A's expected payoff.
Experimental Design
In the experiment, CONTEXT was a between-subjects variable with three
levels and COST was a within-subjects variable with two levels. Additionally, the
expected value of information (EV) was a within-subjects variable. Levels of COST
were zero and positive (0 and 10 units) in the experimental cases. EV levels were
negative, zero, and positive (-10, 0, and +10 units). 1 Each of the six resulting
cases was repeated five times before the subject was presented with another case,
resulting in a total of 30 experimental trials.
All cases with the same stated cost of information were presented together.
Order of presentation with respect to stated cost (ORDER) was treated as a
between-subjects variable and counterbalanced. The order of presentation with
respect to expected value within each level of stated cost was randomized. Ten
subjects were presented with each combination of CONTEXT and ORDER,
resulting in a total of 60 subjects in the design. (See Figure 1.)
| Insert Figure 1 about here.
Experimental Variables
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the experiment is the proportion of times over a
set of game trials a subject chooses to act with private information for a given
case. Since "Manager A" is the only individual in the experimental scenario able
to make such choices, all subjects assumed this role. The role of "Manager B"
was taken by the computer.2
Independent Variables: CONTEXT and COST
Two different contexts involving state uncertainty were used in the
experiment. The first context was an information evaluation problem. The
parameters (e.g., payoffs and probabilities) in the second context were exactly the
same as in the first, except that the problem of information evaluation was
presented as a choice between two production processes. One process allowed the
manager to make decisions contingent on the observed state of nature, while the
other did not. These two contexts will be referred to as the information evaluation
and process choice contexts. In the first of these contexts, the stated cost of
information (COST) was labelled as such. In the second, it was presented as an
additional fixed cost associated with the process allowing contingent choices.
A setting without state uncertainty was also used in the experiment. In
this setting, subjects chose a subgame (labelled a "production process") and an
action to be taken within the subgame. Payoffs for each outcome in the subgames
were the expected values of the outcomes for the settings with state uncertainty.
The dependent variable for this setting is the proportion of times over a set of game
trials a subject chooses the subgame corresponding to private information in the
other settings. This setting will be referred to as the hamc. yame .3
The basic game serves as a "baseline" against which the settings with state
uncertainty can be compared. It is necessary to have such a baseline because
observed misperceptions of information value could have one of two types of
explanations. First, individuals may rely on simplified decision processes
because of the complexity of the experimental problem. This explanation
underlies the discussion of context and task effects presented above. Second,
individual behavior in the game underlying the experimental settings may not
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conform to the noncooperative Nash solution presented in Appendix A. If
subgame choices in the basic game setting do not correspond to the predictions of
the model, this indicates the second explanation is the more appropriate one.
Dependent Variables: EV
EV was treated as a within-subjects variable, in order to have a basis for
testing differences in choice proportions across different levels. Direct tests for
over- or undervaluation of information pose certain problems, at least on an
aggregate level. Since the dependent variable is a proportion, it is difficult to set a
statistical criterion which indicates over- (for negative expected value cases) or
under- (for positive expected value cases) valuation of information. As an
alternative, it is possible to test the significance of differences in the choice
proportions observed for different levels of expected value. These tests are an
indication whether the subjects' perceived value of information differs at varying
levels of expected value. Planned comparisons are employed to indicate if these
differences (or lack of differences) are affected by context and stated cost.
Since the EV variable has three levels, a set of two orthogonal contrasts can
be performed on it. The comparison of primary interest is that between observed
values of the dependent variable for positive and negative EV levels. This
comparison can be written as:
where: Sk denotes the proportion of times subjects choose to play the
private information subgame for cases with EV k
and: k = 1, 2, and 3 denote negative, zero, and positive levels of EV.
As a main effect, this comparison indicates whether subjects perceive the value of
information in the positive EV case to be greater than that in the negative EV
case, or the same. Interactions between other independent variables and this
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comparison indicate whether or not these variables have an effect on perceived
differences in information value.
The second possible contrast in this set is that between zero EV and the
mean of positive and negative EV, or:
fl2-(ai + fl3>2 (2)
Given that the value of the first contrast is significantly greater than zero, this
contrast gives an indication whether the perceived differences between the three
levels of information value are equal. If these differences are equal, then the
value of the second contrast will not be significantly different from zero. If,
however, the difference in choice proportions between zero and positive EV levels
is smaller than that between zero and negative EV, the second contrast will be
positive.
The contrasts specified by Equations 1 and 2 are a set of orthogonal
polynomial contrasts. Therefore, contrasts of the type specified by Equation 1 will
be referred to as linear' in the paper and those of the type specified by Equation 2
will be referred to as 'quadratic'. This does not indicate that precise
mathematical relationships in these forms are expected between EV and
information choice proportions. Instead, these terms will be used to facilitate
further discussion.
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Hypotheses
Let:
ilijk = the proportion of times subjects in CONTEXT i choose to play
the private information subgame (act with private information)
for the case with COST j and EV k
and
i = 1, 2, and 3 denote the basic game, process choice, and information
evaluation settings
j = 1 and 2 denote zero and positive levels ofCOST
k = 1, 2, and 3 denote negative, zero, and positive levels of EV.
The basic game setting is used in this study as a "baseline" against which
results in the settings with state uncertainty are compared. Therefore, the
hypotheses presented below are all based upon predicted interactions of
CONTEXT with COST and EV. The hypotheses are grouped together by
interaction term in the following discussion.
CONTEXT x EV
This interaction is an indicator whether misperceptions of information
value have occurred in one or both settings with state uncertainty. Misperception
of information value is said to have occurred if the contrast between negative and
positive EV levels (the TSVGinear)' contrast) for a setting with state uncertainty is
significantly smaller than that for the basic game. The CONTEXT x EVOinear)
interaction may take one of two forms, depending on which of the premises
regarding the effect of problem wording presented above is true. If information
evaluation behavior is affected by problem wording, then only the EV(linear)
contrast for the information evaluation setting should be significantly smaller
than that for the basic game. On the other hand, if information overvaluation
occurs consistently, regardless of problem wording, the EVOinear) contrasts for
both settings with state uncertainty should both be significantly smaller than for
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the basic game setting. H^ is based on the first of the two premises, while Hm is
based on the second.
H1A: fll»3 ~ fll« 1 = fl2»3 ~ fl2* 1 > fl3*3 _ fl3»l
HiB : fll»3-fll«l > fl2«3-fl2»l =fl3»3 _ fl3*l
A similar set of effects may occur with respect to the relationship between
the observed value of the dependent variable for zero and the other levels of EV. It
is predicted that subjects in the basic game setting will not exhibit a clear
preference for either subgame in the cases representing zero EV levels. This
results in an EV(quadratic) contrast which is equal or nearly equal to zero. On
the other hand, the subjects in either of the settings with state uncertainty may
prefer to act with information when it has zero EV, even though in economic
terms, they should be indifferent between information and no information at this
point. This behavior results in a positive EV(quadratic) contrast, given the
EVQinear) contrast is in the predicted direction. As with the overvaluation of
information, this effect may occur only in the information evaluation setting (H^c)
or in both settings with state uncertainty (Hid).
HiC : fll«2 ~ (fll«l + fll»3) 1 2 = Ci2«2 - (fl2«l + fl2»3) / 2 < JJ3.2 - (fl3»i + 03*3) / 2
Hid- fll»2 - (fll»l + fll*3) I 2 < fl2«2 - (fl2»i + 32.3) / 2 = fl3 #2 " (fl3»l + fl3»3) / 2
CONTEXT x COST
COST should only affect subjects' behavior in the settings with state
uncertainty. It should have no effect in the basic game setting.
H2A: flu* = fli2»
H2B*fl21« >fl22»
^2C : fl31« > fl32«
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CONTEXT x COST x EV
COST may affect the perceived differences between positive and negative
levels of EV, causing them to be greater when information has positive stated cost
than when the stated cost is zero. This would lead to a COST x EV(linear)
interaction. However, this effect should not occur without a related CONTEXT x
COST x EVQinear) interaction, since COST should not have an effect on perceived
differences between levels of EV in the basic game setting. H^x predicts such an
effect will occur in both settings with state uncertainty. Alternatively, the COST x
EVQinear) interaction may differ across state uncertainty contexts. As discussed
earlier, subjects may view the cost of information as a loss in the process choice
context, but as payment for a valuable good in the information evaluation context.
If this occurs, the perceived difference between positive and negative levels of EV
will be affected by cost only in the process choice context. H3B is based on this
prediction.
**3A: (fll23 _ fll2l) ~ (flll3 ~ Olll) < (fl223 " fl22l) - (fl213 " fl21l) =
(0323 ~ fl32l) ~ (0313 ~ fl31l)
H3B: (fli23 ~ 0l2l) _ (flll3 ~ Olll) = (0323 ~ °32l) ™ (0313 ~ 031l) <
(fl223 ~ 022l) ~ (fl213 ~ 021l)
The EV(quadratfc) effect may also interact with CONTEXT and COST.
Given two cases where information has zero EV, but different stated costs,
individuals may prefer to act with information more often in the case where the
stated cost is zero than when it is positive, even though the economic demand
value of information in both cases is equal. If this is so, the EV(quadratic) effect
will be smaller for positive than for zero cost cases. The COST x EV(quadratic)
interaction may occur in both contexts with state uncertainty (H3C).
Alternatively, if subjects frame the stated cost of information differently across
contexts, the interaction may only occur in the process choice context (H31)).
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H3c : am - (am + aii3) / 2 - (fli22 - (fli2i + fli23) / 2 ) <
3212 ~ (3211 + 3213^ 1 2 - (fl222 - (3221 + 3223^ / 2) =
3312 ~ (3311 + 3313^ 1 2 - (3322 ~ (3321 + 3323) / 2)
H3D : 3112 ~ (am + 3113) / 2 ~ (fli22 " (fll21 + fll23) 7 2 ) =
3312 - (3311 + 3313) / 2 - (3322 _ (3321 + 3323) / 2) <
3212 ~ (3211 + 3213^ / 2 - (3222 ~ (3221 + 3223) 1 2)
Subjects and Procedure
The subjects were all students at the University of Texas at Austin.
Twenty-one were fourth-year students in the Program in Professional Accounting
(PPA), 34 were MBA students, and 5 were first-year accounting Ph.D. students.
The experiment was run in a student computer lab at the University of Texas at
Austin using IBM PCs with monochrome monitors. There were six separate
experimental sessions, with from 6 to 16 subjects completing the experiment at
any one time. Subjects participating in the same session were randomly assigned
to different experimental treatments.
The experiment was conducted in four phases: (1) preliminary
instructions, (2) a quiz on the instructions, (3) practice trials, and (4) the main
part of the experiment. At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects
were given a set of instructions consistent with their experimental condition and
assigned to a computer. The computer displayed the game values and expected
values (where appropriate) for the practice trials.4 Subjects were instructed to
read the instructions and examine the computer display, but not to proceed with
the experiment.
When all subjects were set up at their computers, the experimenter gave
them additional brief oral instructions on use of the IBM keyboard and on the
conduct of the experiment. The subjects were informed they would be paid in
cash at the end of the session and reminded they would be eligible for further
prizes, based on their performance. They were instructed to ask any necessary
questions during the quiz or practice trials, since no questions were allowed
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during the main part of the experiment. The subjects were then told to finish
reading the instructions and proceed with the experiment when ready.
The quiz consisted of questions designed to test subjects' ability to correctly
read the payoff matrices. Each subject completed five practice trials. The values
for the practice trials were the same for all subjects. After the practice trials, the
subjects' point endowment was reset to 100 points and they played the thirty actual
trials.
During each trial, the computer prompted the subject for two responses:
(1) an information (in the information evaluation setting) or process choice (in the
basic game and process choice settings) and (2) an action or production plan
choice. In the basic game setting, the computer's ("Manager B's") action and the
payoffs to the- subject and computer were revealed after the subject's response. In
the other settings, a random number representing the state outcome was drawn
and revealed to the subject immediately if he chose to act with information. The
computer's action and the payoffs to the subject and computer were then revealed.
In cases where the subject chose to act without information, the computer's
action was revealed first, then the random number, and finally the payoffs. A
message on the computer screen notified the subject when payoffs or the stated
cost of information were to change on the next trial. After all the experimental
trials were completed, the experimenter verified the subjects' point totals and paid
them in cash.
Subject payoffs for each trial were stated in points. The conversion rate
from points to cash was 1 point = 1 cent. 7 Subjects began the experiment with an
initial endowment of 100 points, and accumulated further payoffs on each of the 30
experimental trials. The expected value (or in the basic game setting, the payoff)
from making the optimal subgame and action choices for all 30 trials was $16.00.
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Combined with the initial endowment, this made the expected value for the entire
experiment $17.00.8
Results
Main Effects
Table 1 is a summary of the proportions with which the subjects chose the
private information subgame, broken down by the four independent variables.
Table 2 presents the results of the repeated measures MANOVA of the data. 9 ' 10
The only significant main effects are those for COST (p < 0.004) and EV (p < 0.001).
The dependent variable proportion for the zero COST level is greater for that for
positive COST (a#1 . = 0.75; a«2» = °-67 )- T^ EV(linear) effect is significantly
greater than zero (a. # . 3 -fl,##1 = 0.86 - 0.50 = 0.36; p < 0.001), as is the
EV(quadratic) effect (a...2- (fl.^i + SI..3) / 2 = 0.08; p < 0.01).
I
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here.
Hypothesized Interactions
The CONTEXT x COST, CONTEXT x EV, and CONTEXT x COST x EV
interactions were all statistically significant (p < 0.06, p < 0.001, and p < 0.03,
respectively). Table 3 displays the results of tests of individual hypotheses. All
these tests were performed using Dunn's multiple comparison procedure [Kirk,
1982, pp. 106-109; Dayton and Schaefer, 1973].
Insert Table 3 about here.
CONTEXT x EV : Only the EVGinear) component of this interaction is
statistically significant (p < 0.001). Values of the EVQinear) contrast are 0.71,
0.16, and 0.22, for the basic game, process choice, and information evaluation
settings, respectively. The comparisons between CONTEXTS shown in Table 3 are
consistent with the predictions ofH^ (See Figure 2.). The absence of a CONTEXT
18
x EV(quadratic) interaction indicates the EV(quadratic) effect occurred
consistently across contexts, including the basic game setting.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
CONTEXT x COST : The effect of COST in the basic game and information
evaluation settings is as predicted (not significant for H4A and p < 0.01 for H4C).
However, no significant effect was found in the process choice setting (H413) (See
Figure 2.).
Insert Figure 3 about here.
CONTEXT x COST x EV : Values of the COST x EVQinear) contrasts are
0.10, -0.25, and 0.08 for the basic game, process choice, and information eval-
uation settings, respectively. Note that the value for the process choice setting is
negative, contrary to predictions. As a result, the difference in contrasts between
the process choice and basic game settings is significant (p < 0.05), but opposite
the predicted direction. The difference between the information evaluation and
process choice settings is significant (p < 0.05) and in the predicted direction, but it
also occurs because the value of the process choice contrast is negative. This
pattern of results is consistent with neither H-j^ nor H3B.
The COST x EV(quadratic) contrasts are -0.11, 0.19, and 0.07 for the basic
game, process choice, and information evaluation settings. This pattern of effects
is also different than predicted. Only the contrasts for the basic game and process
choice settings are significantly different from each other (p < 0.05).
Inspection of Figure 4 shows that COST apparently has a negligible effect
on the dependent variable for all levels of EV in the basic game and a consistent
effect for all levels of EV in the information evaluation setting. In the process
choice setting, the EV (linear) contrast is greater for zero than for positive cost
cases, which is inconsistent with the predicted form of the COST x EV interaction.
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Insert Figure 4 about here.
Interactions with ORDER
In addition to the predicted interactions, two interactions involving the
ORDER variable were significant, ORDER x COST (p < 0.03) and ORDER x
CONTEXT x COST x EV (p < 0.03). The significant (p < 0.01) EV(linear)
component of the second of these interactions indicates learning effects may have
occurred. If learning is taking place in the experiment, the perceived difference
in information value between negative and positive EV cases should be greater in
the second half of the experiment than in the first, regardless of ORDER. This
leads to an interaction between COST, ORDER, and the linear component of EV.
Further investigation of this interaction showed that the difference in choice
proportions between negative and positive EV cases was greater in the second half
of the experiment than in the first in the basic game and information evaluation
settings, but not in the process choice setting. The difference from the first to the
last half of the experiment was statistically significant (p < 0.01) only in the basic
game setting.
Individual Choice Patterns
An analysis was made of individual choice patterns in order to determine
whether they were consistent with the CONTEXT x EV interaction found in the
aggregate data. This analysis is broken down by CONTEXT and COST (See
Table 4.). 11 Payoff maximization was the most common pattern in the basic game
setting. On the other hand, consistently acting with information was the most
common pattern in the settings with state uncertainty. 12 When behavior across
both COST levels is considered, no subjects in the process choice setting
consistently acted as expected payoff maximizers through the entire experiment,
and only one subject did so in the information evaluation setting. In contrast,
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seven subjects in the basic game consistently made choices consistent with payoff
maximization throughout the entire experiment.
Insert Table 4 about here.
To further investigate the CONTEXT x COST x EV interaction, an analysis
of individual shifts in choice proportions across COST levels was also made. This
was done by performing a separate Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test for
each level of EV within each CONTEXT, using response proportions for each
COST level as the dependent variable. None of the comparisons for the basic game
or process choice settings were statistically significant. However, the
comparisons for all levels of EV within the information evaluation setting were all
statistically significant in the expected direction for negative, zero, and positive
EV levels (p = 0.04, p = 0.01, p = 0.02).
Summary, Discussion, and Extensions
Summary ofKey Results
The choices of subjects in both settings with state uncertainty were
relatively unaffected by information EV, compared to the "benchmark" of subjects
playing under conditions of certainty. This effect occurred primarily because of
overvaluation of information with negative EV in both settings with state
uncertainty. Some undervaluation of information with positive EV also occurred,
but to a lesser extent than overvaluation. Analysis of individual choice data
confirmed that overvaluation of information occurred at the individual level in
both settings with state uncertainty.
However, the effects of COST on information evaluation differed in the two
settings with state uncertainty. Within the information evaluation setting, the
effects of COST were in the predicted direction and consistent across EV levels.
This was further supported by the analysis of individual data. It therefore
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appears that subjects in the information evaluation setting tended to focus on
COST as a decision cue within a simplified decision process.
The aggregate effects of COST in the process choice setting, however, were
contrary to predictions. There was virtually no difference in information choice
proportions across EV levels for positive COST cases, and the difference between
EV levels for these cases was less than that for zero COST cases. Examination of
Figure 4 suggests a kind of "reversal" may have occurred at the negative EV level
between the process choice and information evaluation settings. That is, the
observed choice proportion for zero cost cases in the process choice setting is
approximately equal to that for positive cost cases in the information evaluation
setting, and vice versa. However, while analysis of individual choice patterns at
the negative EV level showed a greater tendency to prefer information with zero
than with positive COST in the information evaluation setting, the opposite was
not true for the process choice setting.
Discussion ofResults
One possible explanation for the observed misperceptions of information
value is that the basic structure of payoffs in the decision problem examined here
caused individual behavior to deviate from the Nash noncooperative solution.
Decisions consistent with the Nash solution concept in the experimental task
consist of two stages: (1) evaluating the payoff associated with the optimal action
within each subgame (i.e., evaluating the optimal payoffs for acting with and
without information) and (2) choosing an optimal subgame (i.e., information
system choice) based on that evaluation. The results presented above indicate:
(1) the majority of subgame choices in the basic game setting were consistent with
this decision process and (2) the introduction of an uncertain component into the
task caused subjects to apply alternate decision strategies. However, the results
presented thus far do not indicate at which stage of the optimal decision process
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these deviations occurred. A possible explanation for non-optimal subgame
choices in the settings with state uncertainty is that subjects might not have made
the optimal evaluation of actions within each subgame. However, dominant
actions were chosen 95% of the time in the entire experiment, regardless of
subgame choice. Therefore, subjects in the settings with state uncertainty acted
consistently with the Nash solution concept concerning action choices. However,
they appeared to ignore strategic considerations when making information
system choices.
A second possible explanation is that the level of task demand in the
experiment was not sufficiently high for subjects to select decision strategies
consistent with payoff maximization in the settings with state uncertainty. That
is, subjects consciously decided the costs of implementing complex decision
strategies outweighed the benefits to be gained from their use. Two elements in
particular determined the level of task demand in the experiment. The first was
the stated cost of information. The stated cost effects on task demand discussed
earlier in the paper may not have occurred because the positive stated cost level
was not sufficiently high to trigger the use of analytic strategies. The second
principal task demand element is the opportunity cost associated with making a
non-optimal decision. The opportunity costs in the experiment were relatively
low, since the expected loss from making a non-optimal decision was only 10 units
for cases with positive and negative information EV. These may not have been
sufficiently high to justify the cognitive effort associated with making optimal
decisions.
The cost-benefit approach assumes that the decision maker follows a
conscious, deliberate approach to the selection of decision strategies [Christensen-
Szalanski, 1978, 1980]. However, the experimental results indicate inconsisten-
cies with such an approach. Task demand should have been invariant across
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contextual settings, but the pattern of observed results was not. While one could
argue that the familiarity of the task to subjects might have been affected by
context, a stronger counterargument lies in the fact that the relatively abstract
task should have been unfamiliar to the subjects, regardless of context. Also, the
order effects observed in the process choice setting appeared inconsistent with
conscious strategy selection.
A third possible explanation is that acting with information is a metarule
or metaheuristic . which is used to generate lower-level strategies. Kleinmuntz
and Thomas [19871 propose that decision makers may employ metaheuristics as
an alternative to calculative rationality in choosing strategies for specific tasks.
They describe the use of an infer-then-act metarule, which is used to generate
lower level strategies. This metarule is consistent with the use of uncertainty
avoidance mechanisms discussed in the second section of the paper. The
individual results show that a number of subjects in the experiment exhibited this
type ofbehavior pattern.
Other metarules not yet identified may have been used by subjects who did
not exhibit consistent choice patterns. It is not yet known which factors affect the
use of metaheuristics. They may be "hard-wired", that is, individuals may have a
repertoire of metarules which are automatically called upon when facing certain
task situations. Otherwise, their use may be subject to a simplified choice
process, in which the input includes decision cues such as context.
Extensions of the Study
These competing explanations suggest two extensions of this study. The
first extension would further investigate the effects of task demand on subjective
information evaluation. It would consist of an experiment similar to the present
one in which differing levels of stated information cost and information expected
value are presented to the subjects.
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The second extension would entail gathering verbal reports (e.g.,
concurrent protocols) from subjects as they complete the task. The protocols
would indicate not only if subjects are using simplified decision strategies, but
also if they are consciously aware they are selecting such strategies [Payne, 1982,
p. 397]. These data would also provide evidence as to subjects' awareness of the
importance of the other player's actions in determining their own payoffs.
Conclusions
Misperceptions of information value occurred extensively in this study,
consistent with the findings of other subjective information evaluation studies.
The present results occurred even though complex calculations were not required
to determine the demand value of information in the experiment, as in previous
studies. It appears that a number of subjects used simplified decision strategies
which did not take the strategic implications of information system choice into
account.
Misperceptions of information value, especially information overvaluation,
occurred consistently across different contexts. However, the effects of the stated
information cost task variable were not consistent across contexts. These effects
indicate that researchers need to consider context and task variables when
designing information evaluation experiments, since the results obtained with
one set of variables may not be readily generalizable to others. These effects also
have potential implications for those who design and implement information
systems for use in organizations. The manner in which a given system and the
costs associated with it are presented may cause individuals' subjective
evaluations of the system to vary.
This study also is the beginning of a process of determining wj^y.
individuals misperceive the value of information, rather than merely describing
how they misperceive it. It was shown that the results are consistent with
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current theories of decision strategy selection in some ways, but inconsistent with
them in others. Extensions of the present work will provide a means of further
investigating the information evaluation problem within the current theoretical
framework of decision making research.
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APPENDIXA
The experimental setting can be characterized as a game of imperfect, but
complete information with an uncertain parameter. Imperfect information
indicates the players are unable to observe each others' action choices. Complete
information indicates the players are aware of all the rules of the game, including
each others' payoffs and preferences [Schotter and Schwodiauer, 1980]. The game
can also be thought of as a reformulation of a game of incomplete information,
which is a game characterized by uncertainty about one or more game
parameters [Harsanyi, 1967, 1968].
In the following discussion, Action 1 is denoted a x for Manager A and b x for
Manager B; Action 2 is denoted a2 for Manager A and b2 for Manager B. The two
possible states of nature are denoted si and s2 . Figure A2 shows the extensive
form of the game facing the two managers, based on the parameters in Figure
Al. The game can be decomposed into two anhgames. labelled "informed" and
"not informed" in Figure A2. Manager As decision problem on his first move is
to determine which of the two subgames will yield him a higher payoff.
Insert Figure Al and A2 about here. |
The game can be more easily analyzed by examination of its strategic form
(See Figure A3.). Examination of the no information subgame shows that ax is a
dominant strategy for Manager A, since 50 > 25 and 36 > -50. A similar analysis
shows that bi is a dominant strategy for Manager B. The strategy pair (ai ,
b^ is
thus a Na«h Pmiilihrium (NE); that is, a pair of strategies such that no
player,
assuming the other is committed to his strategy, can increase his payoff
by
unilaterally changing strategies [Shubik, 1982, p.240].
|
Insert Figure A3 about here. I
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The strategic form of the private information subgame shows that Manager
A has a choice of one of four decision rules . For a decision rule a^, the subscript i
indicates Player l's actions when s^ occurs; j indicates his actions when S2 occurs.
For example, a^2 means "choose a^ when s^ occurs; choose a2 when S2 occurs".
The decision rule a^ dominates all of Manager A's other decision rules.
Manager B still must choose between one of two actions as in the no information
case. Manager B's best response to a12 is D2, which makes (a 12, D2) a NE.
The expected value of private information to an individual is his expected
payoff in the private information case, minus his expected payoff in the no
information case. In the present example, the value of private information to the
informed manager is 40 - 50, or -10. Information also has zero value to the
uninformed manager here. The negative value of private information for the
informed manager is in contrast to a single-person or decision-theoretic setting
where the Fineness Corollary of Blackwell's Theorem states that the value of a
finer information system is always greater than or equal to that of a coarser one.
This analysis presumes that the game is only played once. In the
experiment, the game was played repeatedly over multiple trials. The outcome of
a repeated game may differ from that of a single play game under certain
circumstances [Luce and Raiffa, 1957]. Specifically, if the NE point in single plays
is not Pareto-optimal, the players can achieve gains through cooperation in
repeated plays. However, the games used in the experiment were designed so
that the single-play optimal solutions were also optimal for both players in
repeated plays.
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Footnotes
xThe payoffs for the case with EV of -10 and zero COST are shown in
Appendix A (See Figures Al and A3). Other levels of EV were obtained by
changing Manager A's payoff for the outcome (a2, D2) in State 2. For positive COST
cases, 10 units were subtracted from all of Manager A's payoffs in the private
information subgame.
2A secondary reason this was done was to minimize the possibility that
subjects playing non-Nash strategies might confound the results. The computer
was programmed to play its NE strategies in each subgame.
3The term CONTEXT will be used in the remainder of the paper to refer to
both the settings with uncertainty and that without.
^Expected values were displayed in the settings with state uncertainty to
control for the fact that deviations from the expected utility model might be due to
the subjects' limited calculation ability. Calculating expected values for the
subjects in no way trivializes the task. Instead, it allows them to focus upon the
tasks of subgame and action selection, which relate directly to the key issues
examined in this study.
The subjects always chose actions in the basic game setting and when they
were acting without information in the other settings. When they chose to act
with information in the settings with state uncertainty, they were told to choose a
production nlan . which is the same as the decision rules discussed in
Appendix A.
The random numbers ranged from 1 to 100. Random numbers from 1 to 60
indicated the occurrence of State 1, while numbers from 61 to 100 indicated State 2
had occurred.
7Differences in individual risk preferences were controlled for by designing
the experiment so that the ordinal relationship of the expected values for each
strategy combination is maintained under a wide variety of positive monotonic
transformations of the matrix values. (A proof is available from the author.) The
results can only be affected by risk attitude in the case where subjects are
extremely risk-averse or risk-seeking. Such risk attitudes are unlikely to occur,
given the range of payoffs from the experiment. Not only do the predictions of the
game theory model hold under a wide range of preferences for both players, but
they will also hold under a variety of individual beliefs about those preferences.
Additionally, the top and second place subjects in each CONTEXT
treatment group were awarded prizes of $100 and $25.
29
9The proportions were transformed before analysis using an arcsin
transformation (Neter and Wasserman, 1974, p.507) in order to avoid the problem
of unequal variances across different levels of the dependent variable.
10The data meet the compound symmetry assumptions required for a
univariate repeated measures ANOVA, however, the multivariate approach was
used here to facilitate tests of the interaction hypotheses. With repeated measures
MANOVA, the set of orthogonal contrasts on EV is treated as a vector of
dependent variables. For each effect involving EV which MANOVA indicates to
be significant, separate ANOVAs are done on each individual contrast [Bock,
1975, Ch. 7; La Tour and Miniard, 1983]. The multivariate approach is generally
less powerful than the univariate. As a check, univariate tests were run on the
data. No differences were found between the two approaches as to the
significance of main effects or interactions .
llfThe classifications for each level of cost were defined according to private
information subgame choice proportions as follows: payoff maximization—0.2 or
0.0 on the negative EV case, 0.8 or 1.0 on the positive EV case, and any proportion
on the zero EV case; always preferring information~0.8 or 1.0 on all cases. No
meaningful subclassifications could be drawn within the "other" category, except
for the three subjects who consistently acted without information (two acted as
such only when stated cost was positive and one did so for both levels of stated cost-
-all were in settings with state uncertainty).
12The differences across contexts in relative proportions of choice patterns
are statistically significant for both zero stated cost (x2(4) = 8.75; p = 0.07) and
positive stated cost (%2(4) = 29.78; p < 0.0001).
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Table 1
Proportion ofChoices-Private Information Subgame
Breakdownby Cells
Zero Cost
Order Context Negative EV ZeroEV Positive EV
Zero Basic Game 0.54 0.80 1.00
Cost Process Choice 0.50 0.88 0.94
First Info. Evaluation 0.80 0.94 0.88
Mean 0.61 0.87 0.94
Positive Basic Game 0.14 0.72 1.00
Cost Process Choice 0.58 0.82 0.70
First Info. Evaluation 0.58 0.76 0.86
Mean 0.43 0.77 0.85
Mean Basic Game 0.34 0.76 1.00
Values Process Choice 0.54 0.85 0.82
for Contexts Info. Evaluation 0.69 0.85 0.87
OverallMean 0.52 0.82 0.90
Positive Cost
Order Context Negative ZeroEV Positive EV
Zero Basic Game 0.08 0.78 0.94
Cost Process Choice 0.78 0.68 0.80
First Info. Evaluation 0.46 0.66 0.74
Mean 0.44 0.71 0.83
Positive Basic Game 0.32 0.78 0.98
Cost Process Choice 0.66 0.76 0.70
First Info. Evaluation 0.52 0.58 0.76
Mean 0.50 0.71 0.81
Mean Basic Game 0.20 0.78 0.96
Values Process Choice 0.72 0.72 0.75
for Contexts Info. Evaluation 0.49 0.62 0.75
Overall Mean 0.47 0.71 0.82
(Table continues.)
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Table 1, continued
Averaged Across EV and COST
Means across EV levels
Order Context Negative EV ZeroEV Posi
Zero Basic Game 0.31 0.79 0.97
Cost Process Choice 0.64 0.78 0.87
First Info. Evaluation 0.63 0.80 0.81
Mean 0.53 0.79 0.88
Positive Basic Game 0.23 0.75 0.99
Cost Process Choice 0.62 0.79 0.70
First Info. Evaluation 0.55 0.67 0.81
Mean 0.47 0.74 0.83
Mean Basic Game 0.27 0.77 0.98
Values Process Choice 0.63 0.79 0.79
for Contexts Info. Evaluation 0.59 0.74 0.81
Overall Mean 0.50 0.76 0.86
Means across COST levels
Order Context Zero Cost Pos. Cost
Zero Basic Game 0.78 0.60
Cost Process Choice 0.77 0.75
First Info. Evaluation 0.87 0.62
Mean 0.81 0.66
Positive Basic Game 0.62 0.69
Cost Process Choice 0.70 0.71
First Info. Evaluation 0.73 0.62
Mean 0.68 0.67
Mean Basic Game 0.70 0.65
Values Process Choice 0.74 0.73
for Contexts Info. Evaluation 0.80 0.62
OverallMean 0.75 0.67
Averaged Across All Cases
Mean Choice
Order Context Proportion
Zero Basic Game 0.69
Cost Process Choice 0.76
First Info. Evaluation
Mean
0.75
0.73
Positive Basic Game 0.66
Cost Process Choice 0.70
First Info. Evaluation
Mean
0.68
0.68
Mean
Values
Basic Game
Process Choice
0.67
0.73
for Contexts Info. Evaluation 0.71
OverallMean 0.71
2A
Table 2
Multivariate Analysis ofVariance of Proportions
ofPrivate Information Subgame Choices
Wilks For
Source of Variation. Lambda aDDrox. F p
CONTEXT 0.20 0.82
ORDER 0.80 0.38
ORDER x CONTEXT 0.05 0.94
COST 9.06 0.00
CONTEXT x COST 2.95 0.06
ORDER x COST 5.23 0.03
CONTEXT x ORDER x COST 1.34 0.27
EV 0.33 53.05 0.00
Linear 106.46 0.00
Quadratic 6.40 0.01
CONTEXT x EV 0.50 10.97 0.00
Context x Linear 26.40 0.00
Context x Quadratic Lll 0.34
ORDER x EV 1.00 0.02 0.98
Order x Linear 0.03 0.87
Order x Quadratic 0.01 0.94
CONTEXT x ORDER x EV 0.92 1.16 0.33
Context x Order x Linear 1.19 0.31
Context x Order x Quadratic 0.94 0.40
COST x EV 0.98 0.50 0.61
Cost x Linear 0.25 0.62
Cost x Quadratic 0.96 0.33
CONTEXT x COST x EV 0.82 2.74 0.03
Context x Cost x Linear 3.66 0.03
Context x Cost x Quadratic 3.26 0.05
ORDER x COST x EV 0.96 L31 0.28
Order x Cost x Linear 2.67 0.11
Order x Cost x Quadratic 0.29 0.60
ORDER x CONTEXT x COST x EV 0.82 2.86 0.03
Order x Context x Cost x Linear 5.53 0.01
Order x Context x Cost x Quadratic L90 0.16
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Table 3
Analysis ofPredicted Interaction Contrasts
Interaction Q £ E
CONTEXT x COST
Context (1) 0.05 1.25 N.S.
Context (2) 0.01 0.32 N.S.
Context (3) 0.18 3.65 0.01
CONTEXT x EV(Linear)
Context (1)- Context (2) 0.56 6.53 0.01
Context (2) - Context (3) -0.07 -0.50 N.S.
Context (1)- Context (3) 0.49 6.03 0.01
CONTEXT x COST x EV(Linear)
Context (2) - Context (1) -0.35 -2.45 0.05*
Context (3) - Context (2) 0.33 2.22 0.05
Context (3)- Context (1) -0.02 -0.22 N.S.
CONTEXT x COST x EV(Quadratic)
Context (2) - Context (1) 0.30 2.53 0.05
Context (3) - Context (2) -0.12 -0.98 N.S.
Context (3)- Context (1) 0.18 1.55 N.S.
Context (1): Basic Game Setting
Context (2): Process Choice Setting
Context (3): Informaton Evaluation Setting
* denotes two-tailed test. All other tests are one-tailed.
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Table 4
Tabulation ofSubject Choice Patterns by CONTEXT and COST
Basic Process Information
Game Choice Evaluation
Setting Setting Setting Totals
lero Stated Cost
Payoff Maximizing 10 5 4 19
Always Preferring
Pvt. Info. Subgame 2 8 10 20
Other 8 7 6 21
'ositive Stated Cost
Payoff Maximizing 15 1 3 19
Always Preferring
Pvt. Info. Subgame 1 12 7 20
Other 4 7 10 21
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Stated information cost:
Expected value of
information:
Figure 1
Experimental Design
Within-Subjects Variables
(Case Characteristics)
Zero Positive
Negative Zero Positive Negative Zero Positive
Between-Subjects
Variables
Order Context
Basic
Game
Zero cost
first, then Uncertainty
positive Reduction
cost 20
21
Information
Evaluation
30
Subjects
1
10
11
31
Basic :
Game
40.
Positive 41
cost first, Uncertainty
then zero Reduction
cost 50.
51
Information .
Evaluation
60_
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